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Abstract
Recently, a new theory has drawn considerable attention in the literature on com-
mon property. A number of scholars have pointed to the danger of excessive
propertization in the context of what are termed “anticommons” property regimes.
Although this theory has found its way into numerous legal and economic appli-
cations, the empirical and cognitive foundations of the theory of fragmentation
remain unexplored. Based on experimental data, this Article conducts an investi-
gation into the social and personal processes involved in the anticommons.
The results confirm the theoretical proposition that anticommons deadweight losses
increase with the degree of complementarity between individual parts and with the
degree of fragmentation.
Our study also provides three novel insights into the problem of fragmentation.
First, the data illustrate that individual right holders base their reservation price
on a proportion of the expected surplus of the bundler-purchaser, disregarding the
objective value of the resource. Second, the experiments suggest that uncertainty
amplifies the anticommons pricing effect. Individual right holders ignore the ex-
pected value of the purchaser’s project, and instead focus on the upper range of
profitability and surplus. Willingness to accept is anchored onto a proportion of
the maximum profitability, rather than a proportion of the expected benefits of
the project. Finally, throughout the experiment reservation prices seem to be con-
sistently lower in cases where there exists large uncertainty within the range of
positive outcomes, relative to scenarios where there is relative certainty regarding
a positive outcome but which includes the possibility of a (modest) negative out-
come. Subjects seem to emphasize the relative low probability of success over the
possibility of a negative outcome.
The experiment provides clear indications of the pricing effect in settings where
complementary units are fragmented over individual right holders. Given the
stickiness of initial selling prices, and the prospective costs of the required ne-
gotiations to drive prices down to the expected value of the project, value maxi-
mizing projects might be abandoned, leading to the tragic outcome of under use
or idleness. The results thus reinforce the normative hypothesis of the anticom-
mons: property right systems should be careful in allowing the liberal creation
and fragmentation of property rights.
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PUTTING HUMPTY DUMPTY BACK TOGETHER:  
PRICING IN ANTICOMMONS PROPERTY 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Recently, a new theory has drawn considerable attention in the literature on 
common property. A number of scholars have pointed to the danger of 
excessive propertization in the context of what are termed "anticommons" 
property regimes. Although this theory has found its way into numerous legal 
and economic applications, the empirical and cognitive foundations of the 
theory of fragmentation remain unexplored. Based on experimental data, this 
Article conducts an investigation intmo the social and personal processes 
involved in the anticommons.  
 
The results confirm the theoretical proposition that anticommons deadweight 
losses increase with the degree of complementarity between individual parts and 
with the degree of fragmentation.  
 
Our study also provides three novel insights into the problem of fragmentation. 
First, the data illustrates that individual right holders base their reservation 
price on a proportion of the expected surplus of the bundler-purchaser, 
disregarding the objective value of the resource. Second, the experiments 
suggest that uncertainty amplifies the anticommons pricing effect. Individual 
right holders ignore the expected value of the purchaser’s project, and instead 
focus on the upper range of profitability and surplus. Willingness to accept is 
anchored onto a proportion of the maximum profitability, rather than a 
proportion of the expected benefits of the project. Finally, throughout the 
experiment reservation prices seem to be consistently lower in cases where there 
exists large uncertainty within the range of positive outcomes, relative to 
scenarios where there is relative certainty regarding a positive outcome but 
which includes the possibility of a (modest) negative outcome. Subjects seem to 
emphasize the relative low probability of success over the possibility of a 
negative outcome. 
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The experiment provides clear indications of the pricing effect in settings where 
complementary units are fragmented over individual right holders. Given the 
stickiness of initial selling prices, and the prospective costs of the required 
negotiations to drive prices down to the expected value of the project, value 
maximizing projects might be abandoned, leading to the tragic outcome of 
under use or idleness. The results thus reinforce the normative hypothesis of the 
anticommons: property right systems should be careful in allowing the liberal 
creation and fragmentation of property rights. 
 
Keywords: property rights, fragmentation, anticommons pricing 
JEL Classification: K0, K11, D42, L12 
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Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together: An Experimental 
Verification of the the Anticommons  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
An anticommons is a property regime in which multiple owners hold effective 
rights of exclusion in a scarce resource.1 Economic theory has illustrated how 
the coexistence of multiple exclusion rights may lead to sub-optimal uses of 
resources held in common.2 If a common resource is subject to multiple 
exclusion rights held by two or more individuals, each co-owner has incentives 
to withhold resources from other users to an inefficient level. As a result, 
exclusion rights will be exercised even when the use of the common resource by 
one party could yield net social benefits, a problem known as the “Tragedy of 
                                                 
1 This definition of the anticommons employed by Heller provides a powerful tool for 
property theory. Heller recently revitalized the concept in an article on the transition 
to market institutions in contemporary Russia.  He discusses the intriguing prevalence 
of empty storefronts in Moscow. Storefronts in Moscow are subject to under use 
because there are too many owners (local, regional and federal government agencies, 
mafia, etc.) holding the right to exclude. See Heller, M.A. (1998), >The Tragedy of 
the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets=, 111 Harvard 
Law Review, 621. Frank Michelman coined the term anticommons in an article on 
ethics. Michelman defined the anticommons as a type of property in which everyone 
always has rights respecting the objects in the regime, and no one, consequently, is ever 
privileged to use any of them except as particularly authorized by others. This definition has 
almost no counterpart in real-world property relations. The hypothetical example 
provided is that of a wilderness preserve that ‘any person’ has standing to enforce. See 
Michelman, Frank I. (1968), “Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of >Just Compensation= Law,” 80 Harvard Law Review, 1165-1258. The 
title of this paper refers to the fairy tale of Humpty Dumpty to illustrate the 
anticommons. When Humpty Dumpty is shattered into pieces all of the king’s horses 
and all of the king’s men cannot re-assemble him, which stands in contrast to the ease 
with which he broke into pieces in the first place. See Heller, Michael A. (1999), ‘The 
Boundaries of Private Property’, 108 Yale Law Review 1163-1223. 
 
2 Anticommons theory relies on Cournot's model of duopoly: a single monopolist 
producing a composite good will charge a price lower than the sum of the prices that 
would be charged by two complementary duopolists selling the single component parts. 
A. Cournot, A (1838), Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth 
(Nathaniel Bacon, trans., Macmillan 1927). 
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the Anticommons.”3 Take the example of medical innovation. It is held that 
awarding private property rights on discoveries promotes innovation and the 
commercial development of new technologies. In light of the anticommons 
intellectual property rights on research may actually retard life-saving 
developments of medical products based on this research when too many 
owners block each other from the use fo these products.4 The tragedy of the 
anticommons may occur because the multiple holders of exclusion rights do not 
fully internalize the cost created by the enforcement of their right to exclude 
others.  
 
The intuition underlying the anticommons is that it is often harder to 
regenerate separated bundles than it is to fragmentize.5 Economic models 
assume that the costs of rebundling (transaction costs and strategic behavior) 
independently-owned property fragments are higher than the costs involved in 
the initial fragmentation. This “stickiness” of fragmentation is problematic when 
the costs of bundling prevent value maximizing uses of the resource. When a 
                                                 
3 The pioneering articles include Heller, M.A. (1998), >The Tragedy of the 
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets=, 111 Harvard Law 
Review, 621; Heller, M.A. (1999), >The Boundaries of Private Property=, 108 Yale 
Law Review, 1163-1223; Heller, M. and Eisenberg, R. (1998), >Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research=, 280 Science, excerpted as 
>Upstream Patents = Downstream Bottlenecks= in 41.3 Law Quadrangle Notes, 
93_97 (Fall/Winter 1998). The principal follow-up articles are Buchanan, J. and Yong 
J. Yoon. 2000. “Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons Property,” 43 
Journal of Law and Economics 1-13; Depoorter, B. and Parisi F. (2002), ‘Fair Use and 
Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation’, 21 (4) International Review of Law 
and Economics, 453-473. 
 
4 Heller, M. and Eisenberg, R. (1998), >Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research=, 280 Science, excerpted as >Upstream Patents 
= Downstream Bottlenecks= in 41.3 Law Quadrangle Notes, 93-97 (Fall/Winter 
1998): “more intellectual property rights may lead paradoxically to fewer useful 
products for improving human health”. 
 
5 In the words of Heller: “Once an anticommons emerges, collecting rights into usable 
private property may prove to be brutal and slow.” Heller (2001), ‘Symposium: Critical 
Approaches to Property Institutions: Three Faces of Private Property’, 79 Or. L. Rev. 417, 
418, 424. 
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value enhancing opportunity arises which allows for the exploitation of the 
complementarities between different parts of the fragmented property, the ex-
ante rational choice may turn out to be ex-post sub-optimal, given the greater 
costs of reunification. 6  
 
To date, the economic literature has omitted analysis of the precise factors that 
lead reunification efforts to fail. Is the unsuccessful bundling of complementary 
inputs a result of transaction costs or is the decision-making process clogged by 
strategic behavior and cognitive error? If so, what social and cognitive processes 
lie at the root of the anticommons problem? This Article runs a number of 
experiments. We unpack the economic model of the anticommons, verify its 
theoretical premises, and suggest further inroads for research.  
 
Section 2 describes the structure of the experiment. Section 3 presents the 
results of our experiment. Section 4 provides a discussion of the results. The 
discussion enriches the theoretical foundation of the anticommons by 
measuring the impact of complementarity, the degree of fragmentation,  
uncertainty and bargaining in generating deadweight losses. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY 
 
We conduct an investigation into the social and personal processes involved in 
decision-making by individual co-owners of a resource. From these results we 
deduce a number of propositions on the cognitive processes at root of the 
anticommons. To this purpose, we surveyed three hundred college students.  
 
The experiment recreates the constitutive elements of an anticommons 
situation: (1) a valuable resource is divided into fragments, (2) a value 
enhancing opportunity arises which requires bundling of these fragments.  
 
The survey measures reservation prices under varying 1) degrees of 
complementarity among fragmented parts; 2) numbers of rights holders with 
                                                 
6 See Buchanan, J. and Yong J. Yoon. 2000. “Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and 
Anticommons Property,” 43 Journal of Law and Economics 1-13; Schulz, Norbert; Parisi 
Francesco & Depoorter, Ben (2003), ‘Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General 
Model’, 158 (4) Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics 594-613. 
- 6 - 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art11
complementary rights into a resource; 3) synergies resulting from fragmentation; 
and 4) degrees of uncertainty concerning the surplus to be achieved from 
reunification. The first part of the survey collects data on reservation prices 
under these varying conditions. In the second part of our experiment we 
simulated one-time negotiations between the reunifier and each individual right 
holder.  
 
In the first experiment all participants received a script detailing participants’ 
status as a partial-right holders to a unitary resource,7 the presence of a third-
party purchasor, and the particulars of the sub experiment. The questions in the 
script are ordered randomly to avoid learning experiences.8 Also, in the second 
experiment subjects were randomly assigned to a specific condition and 
informed in a structured information script prior to negotiations. Every 
experiment was designed to measure the statistical data on a parametrical level. 
More precisely, we used a multivariate repeated measure ANOVA.9 Two sub 
experiments deviate from this statistical method and were replaced by a one way 
ANOVA because of the between subject measurement format.10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 No significant effect was found for age or gender. 
 
8 When all subjects receive the script with questions in the same order, the first trial 
could influence their opinion in the second trial and so on. When subjects receive the 
scripts in random order the learning effect is nullified. 
 
9 This involves the application of the analysis of variance to data in which a single 
dependent variable is measured on more than one occasion on the same subject. In the 
case of an orthogonal factorial design, the method essentially combines, in a linear 
fashion, the information of the several response variables in such away as to detect any 
existing treatment effects. See Johnson, R. A. and Wichern, D. W. (1998), Applied 
multivariate statistical analysis, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
 
10 Various groups of participants were assigned to the different variables (2, 3, 4 or 5 
parts). Every group had to decide on the price of the part assigned to them. 
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3. RESULTS 
 
3.1. Surveys A and B 
 
Each participant11 is informed that he or she is one of five partial-right holders 
(owners) to a unitary resource. The participants are informed that a third-party 
is looking to purchase a number of parts. In the various parts of the tests this 
number ranges between 2 to 5 parts. Students are further informed that each 
individual part, by itself, has a market value of 50 dollars.12 The aggregate value 
of the unified bundle is 250 dollars. No further information on the incentives of 
the third-party (such as profitability and synergies resulting from bundling) is 
disclosed at this point.  In a first hypothetical, each student is informed that the 
purchaser seeks to obtain 2 out of 5 of the parts that are divided among five 
participants. In a subsequent condition, other participants are informed that the 
purchaser needs to obtain 3, 4 or all 5 parts. In each of these scenarios the 
participants list their reservation price13 while attempting to maximize their 
personal gains. The survey thus measures the differences in reservation prices 
arising in situations involving varying degrees of complementarity. Where the 
third party only looks to purchase 2 parts, this represents a relative low degree 
of complementarity, or conversely a case of relatively high substitutability. On 
the other end, where the hypothetical indicates that the third party needs to 
purchase all 5 parts, this represents a situation of perfect complementarity.  
                                                 
11 The population of this study consists a random group of first-year students of the 
departments of law, political science and economics at Ghent University who were 
randomly assigned to one of the experiments. 
 
12 We operate from the stylized assumption that there is no difference between the 
market price of each individual part and the subjective value to each of the owners. In 
other words, we control for any idiosyncratic qualities of the parts or cognitive 
attachments to the parts, such as negative endowment effects. The cognitive effects 
involved in the decision-making process of rebundling are explored further on in this 
study. 
 
13 We employ the term ‘reservation price’ to denote the initial selling price, as stated by 
the individual right holder. Strictly speaking this price is not necessarily a reservation 
price in that this stated price is the lowest outcome a negotiator is willing to accept. 
However, because in all experiments, except E, no negotiations are held, we assume 
that initial right holders do, in effect, not accept an agreement that does not match this 
initial selling price. 
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Parts Mean Standard Deviation N 
2 
3 
4 
5 
64.6 
69.5 
76.3 
100.1 
18.65 
15.27 
35.57 
48.34 
20 
20 
20 
20 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistic, between subjects 
 
Parts Mean Standard Deviation 
2 
3 
4 
5 
67.4 
72.6 
80,2 
107.1 
19.57 
26.38 
36.12 
57,99 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistic, within subjects (N = 20) 
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Figure 1: The mean demand price for the different parts measured 
                       between subjects (ANOVA, F(3,76) = 4.73, p < .01) 
 
Table 1 and accompanying figure 1 map the variation between mean reservation 
prices.  The mean demand price in the case of low complementarity is 67. The 
aggregate mean price is thus 134; a total of 34 price units above the objective 
value of two combined parts. In the case of perfect complementarity the mean 
demand price is 100 dollars, totaling a mean demand price of 500 dollars for the 
combined purchase of all individual parts. While reservation prices for “2 out of 
5 complementarity” total 34% over the objective value, a case of strict 
complementarity averages a combined demand price that is 100 % above the 
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objective value. These simple findings confirms the theoretical findings that 
reservation prices correlate with the strength of veto-right into the successful 
bundling of the individual parts.  
 
We repeated the same experiment but measured repeatedly with the same 
subjects in each of the different conditions (2, 3, 4 and 5 parts) (between 
subjects). This allowed us to verify whether subjects reason differently when 
asked to list a price in just one of the above scenarios, than when each 
individual subject is asked to formulate prices for all of the scenarios (within 
subjects).14 The results - see table 2 – significantly correspond with the prior, 
within subject, findings (Repeated Measure ANOVA, F(3,17) = 5.42, p < .01).  
 
 
3.2 Survey C  
 
In Experiment C we attach various degrees of profitability to the profitablity and 
measure the impact on the reservation prices of the individual right holders. As 
before, participants (N = 84) are one of five partial-right holders (owners) to a 
unitary resource. They are informed that a third-party is looking to purchase all 
five parts held by the individual owners. Again, each individual part has an 
objective value of 50 dollars and the aggregate value of the unified bundle is 250 
dollars.  By explictly assigning the value of each right we attempt to eliminate 
the “attribution effect” whereby people sytematically overvalue the role of their 
right in the overall project.15
                                                 
14 When an experiment is conducted “within subjects” every participants is assigned to 
all treatments in a randomly selected order. In such experiment there is a risk that 
participants’ selling prices differs according to the initial scenario (assembly of 2, 3, 4, 
or 5 required parts) first assigned to them. Such bias could be attributed to the initial 
scenarios working as a referent point in the mind of the participants. In such a case 
participants might not fully focus on the amount of parts the third party seeks to gather 
(degree of complementarity). 
 
15 The attribution bias holds that individuals systematically overvalue their assets and 
disparage the claims of their co-right holders. See L. Ross and Anderson C.A., in 
Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, D. Kahneman et al., Eds. (Cambridge 
Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982, pp. 129-152. Heller and Eisenberg suggest that this 
particular cognitive bias explains bargaining breakdowns in the biotechnology industry, 
where scientists tend to overvalue the importance of their discoveries for the 
development of follow-up, aggregate inventions. See Heller and Eisenberg, p. 701. 
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This time also the opportunity costs of the third party are disclosed. The 
participants are requested to state their demand price in each of five 
hypothetical scenarios with varying profits to be obtained by the third-party 
purchaser from bundling all five parts. In five different scenarios participants are 
informed that bundling creates a surplus for the third party of 100, 300, 500, 
1000 or 10.000 dollars. These scenarios each represent different values resulting 
from reunification. In the last hypothetical the “sum is worth more than its 
parts” by 9750 dollar (10.000 – 250). In such scenario, unsuccessful rebundling, 
imposes considerable deadweight losses– as higher valued uses are not 
consumated. This represents a more substantial “tragedy” of the anticommons 
in comparison to the first hypothetical where a modest 100 dollar is at stake in 
the effort to rebundle. Figure 2 plots the reservation prices in all five instances of 
surplus profitability. The vertical axis marks the asking price, expressed in 
relative percentage to the profits, or synergies of bundling. The horizontal axis 
indicates the cases of a third party profit of 100, 300, 500, 1000, 10.000 dollars 
respectively. As figure 2 below indicates, that there is no significant difference 
(F(3,81) = 1.28, p = .168) between reservation prices in the profit range 
between 300 and 10.000 dollars: the average price stated by each of the right 
holders approximates 26%. In the case of a surplus of 10.000, the purchaser is 
faced with an aggregate mean asking price of 12.300 dollars. This price is 24.6% 
above the price that he or she can offer lest the project, involving rebundling, 
remain profitable. Similarly, when the profit from bundling is a more modest 
300 dollars (plot 2 on graph 2, a median asking price is 26.6 % or 79.8 dollars 
per part), the combined reservation price is 399. Thus, the difference between 
reservation prices in the surplus range of 300 and 10.000 is non-significant.  
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Figure 2: The degree of profitability from bundling of fragmented property entitlements on the  prices charged by 
individual right holders (F(4, 80) = 5.391, p < .001) 
 
 
3.3 Survey D & E 
 
Experiment D measures the effect of uncertainty regarding the expected 
benefits of the bundling of fragmented property entitlements. Again, 
participants (N = 40) are informed that they are one of five partial-right 
holders (owners) to a unitary resource. A third-party is looking to purchase all 
five parts held by the individual owners. Students are informed that each 
individual part has an objective value of 50 dollars. The aggregate value of the 
unified bundle is 250 dollars. As in Section 3, the opportunity costs of the third 
party are disclosed. This time however, the subjects are also informed that the 
purchaser faces considerable uncertainty as to the profitability of the project. 
The participants are requested to state their demand price in each of five 
hypothetical scenarios with varying profits to be obtained by the third-party 
purchaser from bundling all five parts. This time however, additional 
information is provided as to the uncertainty regarding the profitability of the 
project. In four different scenarios participants are informed that bundling 
creates a surplus for the third party of 100, 500, 1000 or 10.000 dollars with a 
probability of 10%. In each of the scenarios there is a 90% chance that bundling 
does not create any surplus. The expected values of each of these projects are 
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respectively 10, 50, 100 and 1000 dollars. Are the subjects responsive to the 
lower expected value generated by the high degree of uncertainty? Again, the 
results give rise to pessimism. From the results it follows that subjects 
consistently demand a proportional share of 10% of the maximum profit. The 
mean reservation price, set by one individual right holder, is 14.25% of the 
surplus (see Fig. 3). Put differently, the aggregate reservation price is 7 times 
above the expected value of the project (F(3,37) = 20.31, p < .001).16 Given 
the expected benefit of the project (market value of the parts) the gap between 
purchaser’s willingness to pay and individual owner’s willingness to accept is 
non-negligible. 
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Figure 3:  The expected profit of bundling the fragmented property under a 90% uncertainty for the  
   individual holders. (F(3,37) = 4.43 , p < .01)  
 
 
These results are confirmed in a second similar test (see Fig. 4) under a higher 
degree of uncertainty – where there is a 99% chance that bundling does not 
create any surplus. The expected value of each of these projects is respectively 
                                                 
16 When there is certainty of 10% of surplus from bundling, this means that every 
individual holder maximum price is 2% of surplus. When asking 14.25% the aggregate 
price totals seven times the expected value of the projects. The statistical difference 
between the 2% case and the observed reservation prices (F(3,37) = 20.31, p < .001) 
is significant. 
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1, 5, 10 and 100. Again, the subjects seem unresponsive to the lower expected 
value generated by the high degree of uncertainty. From the results it follows 
that subjects consistently demand a proportional share of 11.44% of the 
maximum profit. The median price, set by one individual right holder, is 57 
times above the expected value of the project. The aggregate the individual 
right holder’s willingness to accept is 57 beyond the willingness to pay-price of 
the purchaser, given the expected benefit of the project.  
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Figure 4: The expected profit of bundling the fragmented property under a 99% uncertainty for the  
   individual holders.  (F(3,37) = 2.40, p < 0.05) 
 
 
c(3 times the amount of the gains of the positive outcome). Again, subjects (N 
= 78) were informed that they are one of the partial-right holders to a unitary 
source and that a third-party is interested to purchase all five parts. Each 
individual part has a value of 50 dollar and when the third-party bundles the 
five parts this generates surplus of 125 dollars with a probability of 80% and a 
20% probability of a loss of 450 dollars. In two different scenarios students were 
asked the same questions but with a surplus of 1250 or 12500 and a loss of 4500 
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or 45000. The expected values of each of these projects are respectively, 10, 100 
and 1000 dollars.17
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Figure 5:  The expected profit of bundling the fragmented property for the holders under a 80% certainty of a 
surplus vs. 20% uncertainty of losing an amount of money for the purchaser. (F(2,76) = 15.19 , p < .001)
  
 
Figure 5 confirms the findings of the other experiments. When stakes are minor 
the individual right holders set disproportionately high reservation prices – 35% 
in the case of a project with expected value of 100 dollars (this totals a 
combined reservation price of 175%). When stakes are higher the average 
reservation price remains relatively stable at 14-19% of the expected surplus.  
 
Next we compare the reservation prices in cases of high uncertainty of high 
outcomes and high certainty of modest outcomes (with a possible negative 
result) while expected benefits are equal. In the case of a positive outcome of 
100 with 10% probability the mean reservation price was 24% of the expected 
value, compared to 35% of the expected value of the low risk-low profit variant 
of experiment E. In the case of positive outcome of 1000 with 10% probability 
in D (high risk-high profit) the mean reservation price was 12%, versus 19% in 
the low risk-low profit variant of E. In the case of positive outcome of 10000 with 
10% probability in D (high risk high outcome) the mean reservation price was 
                                                 
17 A probability of 80% to win a surplus of 125 dollar gives a expected value of 100 
dollars, while a chance of loss is 450 dollars with a probability of 20% which us 90 
dollars. 100 dollars minus 90 dollars gives us expected benefit of 10 dollars.  
- 15 - 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
10%, versus 13% in the low risk-low profit variant of E (80% chance of +12500 
and 20% chance of -45000). Although the expected values of each of these 
scenarios are identical, reservation prices seem to be consistently lower in cases 
where there is large uncertainty regarding a strictly positive outcome than when 
there is relative certainty but with a chance of a negative outcome (See Figure 
6, F(2,75) = 4.92,  p < .01). Upon further examination we find analogous 
results for instances where the surplus amounts to 100 dollars and 1000 dollars 
(see Figure 7) under high risk levels vs. low risk levels (F(2,75) = 10.43,  p < 
.001).  
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  certainty: 80% surplus of 125 and 20% of losing 450 
  uncertainty 1: 1 % certainty of surplus equal to 1000 
         uncertainty 2: 0.10% certainty of surplus equal to 10.000 
 
Figure 6: Different results for under certainty and uncertainty under identical expected surplus (10 dollars) 
(F(2,75)=4.92,  p < .01) 
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Figure 7: Different results when a same surplus (1000 dollars) given under certainty and uncertainty F(1,76)= 
4.13, p < .05 
 
 
3.4 Survey F  
 
Experiment F is constructed along the lines of the previous surveys. Again, 
subjects (N = 62) are informed that they are one of five partial-right holders of 
a unitary resource and that a third party is looking to purchase all five parts. 
Every individual part is valued at 50 dollars. When the purchaser rebundles the 
five parts he obtains a surplus in a range between a minimum and a maximum 
expected value. In a random order the six trials indicated an expected surplus 
between respectively 100-500, 1000-5000 and 10.000-50.000 in the different 
trials. This experiment differs from section 4.1 and 4.2 in that the probability 
and exact profit remain unknown. The knowledge of subjects is restricted to the 
range within which the profits are situated. This experiment is more realistic 
because, as in real-life situations, precise probabilities remain unknown. For 
instance, when a real estate developer seeks to purchase 5 adjacent tracts, it is 
more likely that the land owners base their initial reservation prices on a rough, 
highly subjective estimate of the value to the entrepreneur, rather than 
probability and profit estimates of the individual provided to subjects in sections 
4.2 and 4.3. 
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Figure 8: The expected profit of bundling the fragmented property for the holder’s purchaser under    the 
uncertainty about the amount of the surplus. (F(2,60) = 4.15 , p < .05) 
 
 
When the surplus is situated in the 100-500 range, the individual owners 
demand 32% or 83 dollars of the average surplus of 300. The average 
reservation price is 415 dollars. With regard to the higher profit ranges the 
average reservation price is 17.5% of the average surplus of 3000 and 30000. 
Again two observations appear. First, participants employ all or nothing tactics, 
demanding relatively high prices, when stakes are minor.18 Secondly, when 
stakes are high, subjects’ reservation prices are based on a percentual amount of 
the expected profit of the buyer, irrespective of objective market value of an 
individual part.  
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. SURVEY A & B: COMPLEMENTARITY  
 
In survey A and B we measured the magnifying effect of complementarity of 
fragmented property entitlements on the occurrence of anticommons losses. 
 
                                                 
18 The wider variance within this cell suggests that this finding possibly is a confound 
resulting from the low values. 
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Prior theoretical research on anticommons fragmentation claims that the 
severity of the deadweight losses from concurrent possession of complementarity 
right increases monotonically with the number of independent holders: “The 
greater the number of individuals who can independently price an essential 
input, the higher the equilibrium price that each of these individuals will 
demand for his own license. At the margin, as the number of [right] holders 
approaches very large numbers (or infinity), complete abandonment of valuable 
resources will result.”19
 
While reservation prices for “2 out of 5 complementarity” total 34% over the 
objective value, a case of strict “5 out of 5” complementarity averages a 
combined demand price that is 100 % above the objective value. These simple 
findings confirms the theoretical findings that reservation prices correlate with 
the strength of veto-right into the successful bundling of the individual parts.  
 
This basic result of surveys A and B are not surprising. Selling prices are higher 
when a seller has more individual bargaining power. The following Section will 
illustrate that the anticommons effect goes beyond the classical deadweight 
losses of monopoly and will indicate problems that are intrinsic to joint 
monopolies regarding complements. 
 
 
4.2. SURVEY C: RESERVATION PRICES AND THE SIZE OF THE PIE 
 
Experiment C examines the influence of higher degrees of profitability on the 
reservation prices of the individual right holders. We contrast situations where 
reunification of fragmented parts resulted in very substantial profits with 
situations where reunifaction created very modest gains. The results give little 
reason to believe that, from the perspective of uncoordinated selling prices, the 
problem is less pronounced in the case of higher potential waste or underuse. 
The results indicate that the anticommons problem does not discriminate 
between cases that entail considerable opportunity for profits and minor ones. 
As illustrated in  figure 2 above, there is no significant difference of reservation 
prices in the profit range between 300 and 10.000 dollars: the average price 
stated by each of the right holders approximates 26%. In the case of a surplus of 
                                                 
19 Depoorter, B. and Parisi F. (2002), ‘Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price 
Theory Explanation’, 21 (4) International Review of Law and Economics, 460-61. 
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10.000, the purchaser is faced with an aggregate mean asking price of 12.300 
dollars. This price is 24.6% above the price that he or she can offer lest the 
project, involving rebundling, remain profitable. Similarly, when the profit from 
bundling is a more modest 300 dollars (plot 2 on graph 2, a median asking price 
is 26.6 % or 79.8 dollars per part), the combined reservation price is 399. Thus, 
the difference in reservation prices between a surplus of 300 and 10.000 is non-
significant.  
 
The implication is that, in attempting to rebundle subdivided parts, a third party 
purchaser faces reservation prices that significantly outweigh the expected 
profitability of the attempted reunification, regardless of the size of the interest 
at stake. All else being equal, a third party with a highly profitable or with a 
more modest project, faces prices that are, to the same proportion, beyond the 
expected value of the project. An oil company seeking to acquire 4 adjacent 
parcels of land for the purpose of optimal drilling with a potential for efficiency 
savings of 2 million dollars faces a negotiation problem comparable to an editor 
trying to assemble the copyrights from 4 different authors for an anthology on 
American writing (with profitability of 1000 dollars). This confirms the findings 
of Libecap and Wiggins that unitization of oil fields, involving multiple right 
holders, might fail despite the tremendous gains that can be reaped by 
unitisatizing oil fields.20
 
This survey indicates that subjects hold a certain percentage (approximately 
25%) of the profit as a focal point as to what they deem to be the price at which 
they are willing to sell their individual part. Regardless of any endogenous 
motivation for this proportion (evaluations of fairness, etc) the fact of the 
matter is that 5 people are each asking a demand price of 25% of the expected 
benefits. The overall result is a total selling price that is beyond the expected 
value of the project.  
 
 
4.3 SURVEY D & E: THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY  
 
Next we measured the effect of uncertainty regarding the expected benefits of 
the bundling of fragmented property entitlements.  Surveys D and E respectively 
examine conditions of high degrees of uncertainty regarding strictly positive 
                                                 
20 See Libecap, Gary D. and Wiggins Steven N. (1984), ‘Contractual Responses to the 
Common Pool’, 74 American Economic Review 84. 
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outcomes (with large upsides) and conditions of low degrees of uncertainty 
regarding more modest outcomes (with a modest chance of substantial losses). 
 
 
4.3.1. High Degrees of Uncertainty with Large Upside 
 
From the results it follows that subjects consistently demand a proportional 
share of 10% of the maximum profit. The mean reservation price, set by one 
individual right holder, is 14.25% of the surplus (see Fig. 3 above). In our results 
aggregate reservation prices are 7 times above the expected value of the project. 
 
These results suggest that subjects ignore the expected value of the purchaser’s 
project, and instead focus on the upper range of profitability. Willingness to 
accept seems to be anchored onto a proportion of the maximum profitability, 
rather than a proportion of the expected benefits of the project. Subjects seem 
to take the most positive outcome of bundling as a focal point for the division of 
surplus with the purchaser. At first blush, this strategy may simply reflect a 
profit maximizing rationale on the part of complementary right holders. 
 
In the aggregate, however, this presents a gloomy scenario. The third party 
needs to drive reservation prices, as initially stated by the individual right 
holders, down to a price level that is below 50% of the initial stated price. Prior 
experimental research has demonstrated that initial selling prices are sticky, i.e. 
they influence the outcome of negotiations.21 In the advent of these expected 
bargaining costs, projects with uncertainty have a higher chance of failing, by 
placing such considerable negotiation burdens on those engaged in high risk 
projects. The prospect of such high demands by complementary right holders, 
may lead projects that involve higher degrees of uncertainty to be forsaken, 
despite positive expected values.  
 
These findings are particularly relevant for the domain of patent law. 
Intrinsically, the development of medical products from broad based inventions 
                                                 
21 Doob, A. et al. (1969), Effect of initial selling price on the subsequent sales, 11 (4), 
Journal-of-Personality-and-Social-Psychology, 345-350. A number of field experiments 
investigated the effect of an initial selling price on subsequent sales of common 
household products. The results are consistent with dissonance theory in that 
subsequent sales prices track initial prices. 
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involve a high risk of uncertainty – history has demonstrated that the path of 
innovation is unpredictable.22 In this area substantial investments in research 
and development provide no guarantees. When the risk of research and 
development is high and this risk is not accounted for in the licensing prices of 
upstream patents, medical research may be biased towards low-risk enterprises. 
The counter-intuitive result is thus that that broad patent protection lowers 
research in path breaking, high risk-high payoff research activities. 
 
On a general level, the profits obtained by bundling the individual parts can be 
conceptualized as a commons. To the extend that right holders own  
complements to a valuable resource they are concurrent owners of a shared 
opportunity. As with overharvasting of common resources, uncertainty about 
the size of a commons leads to lower levels of cooperation. In our anticommons 
findings higher degrees of uncertainty regarding the profitabiltiy of the project 
leads to higher demands by the stakeholders. In the face of these increasing 
demands, projects with higher uncertainty (even if they have identical expected 
values) are more likely to be forsaken as right-holders demand more themselves, 
while expecting that others will demand more (see Budescu et al. 1990, 1992, 
1995). The results thus indicate that anticommons property conditions share 
with common resource dillemas the negative behavioral impact of of pool size 
uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Historical examples of the unfatomability of getting to an accurate estimation of the 
expected value of present inventions include IBM’s underestimation of the future 
market of home computers. Merges, Robert P. (1994), ‘Intellectual Property Rights and 
Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents’, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 75, footnote 
41 (citing Rosenberg, Nathan (1994), Exploring the Black Box: Technology, Economics 
and History 220: ‘The computer was regarded by its inventors as a purely scientific 
device...’ (quoting from Katz, Barbara G. And Phillips, Almarin (1980), ‘The Computer 
Industry’, in Nelson, Richard R. (Ed.), Goverment and Technological Progress 162, 171. 
See also Elster, Jon (1983), Explaining Technical Change 111; Mokyr, Joel (1990), The 
Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress 154; Freeman, 
Christopher (1982), The Economics of Industrial Innovation, 2nd ed., Cambridge, M.A., 
MIT Press, 75. 
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4.3.2. Low Degrees of Uncertainty with Large Downside 
 
Experiment E measured prices under situations where the 
purchaser/entrepreneur faces a high probability of modest gains but at the same 
time there is also a modest risk of a more substantial loss (low risk-low profit 
model).  
 
Although the expected values of each of the several scenarios were identical, 
reservation prices were consistently lower in cases with a large uncertainty 
regarding the size of the (strictly) positive outcome than in cases with relative 
certainty but with a modest chance of a negative outcome (See Figure 6 above). 
A possible explanation for this result is that subjects emphasize the relative low 
probability of success in D over the possibility of a negative outcome in E.  
 
Following, the framing effect as described by Tversky and Kahneman,23 it is 
assumed that individuals adopt different reference points as decision outcomes 
are framed differently. Similarly, our results illustrate the influence of the 
communicated frame by the bundler. Although the expected value from the 
projects in survey D and E are identical, reservation prices were lower when the 
expected value was denoted solely in terms of gains. The are a number of 
possible interpretations of this outcome. The results parallel the findings of de 
Deu et al. that individual right holders are less likely to make price concessions 
                                                 
23 The prototype of a framing task is the Asian disease problem. Participants are told 
about an epidemic of Asian flu, which is expected to kill 600 people in the USA. They 
then have to choose between two options: option A saves 200 people with certainty; 
option B saves all 600 people with probability p = 1/3 or nobody. Options A and B are 
framed as gains. Options C and D introduce a negative framing. By implementing 
option C 400 people will die for sure, and by implementing option D all 600 people will 
die with probability p = 2/3 or nobody will die. Although each of the options have an 
identical expected value (in terms of lives saved), it is attributed to the framing effect 
that participants prefer option A (the sure option) over B (the risky option) in the 
positive framing condition, and prefer option D (the risky option) over C (the sure 
option) in the negative framing condition. See Kahneman D. and Tversky, A. (1979), 
‘Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk’, 51 Econometrica, 263-291; 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1981), ‘The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology 
of Choice’, 221 Science, 453-458. 
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when the payoffs of the bundler are conceptualized from a loss perspective.24 
Also, in our experiment subjects seem to emphasize probabilities over possible 
losses.25 Put differently, in considering selling off their rights, sellers seem to 
discount the purchaser’s potential losses more than uncertainty on the positive 
side. The tendency of the right holders to decrease reservation prices when the 
reference-outcome is positive, suggests a higher willingness of right holders to 
cooperate with positive projects. Alternatively, the added complexity in the 
aggregate calculation of expected values involving positive and negative 
outcomes might lead to more exagerated demands because of the stronger non-
calculative nature of collective decision making in those instances.26
 
*** 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The “Tragedy of the Anticommons” denotes situations where veto rights are 
exercised even when the use of the common resource by one party could yield 
net benefits for all parties involved. This experiment explores how, when a 
common resource is subject to multiple exclusion rights held by two or more 
                                                 
24 See de Dreu, Carsten K.W., et al. (1994), Effects of Gain-Loss Frames in Negotiation: 
Loss Aversion, Mismatching, and Frame Adoption, 60 Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes 90-107. 
 
25 The adoption of a positive or negative frame has empirically been found to affect the 
outcome of dyadic negotiations. Such frames may influence the outcome of further 
negotiations. For example negative framing induces greater risk seeking so that 
negotiators with a negative frame make fewer concessions and more often fail to reach 
agreement than negotiators with a positive frame. Bazerman, M. H., Magliozzi and T. 
Neale, M. A. (1985). ‘Integrative bargaining in a competitive market’. 34 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 294-313; Bottom, W. P. and 
Studt, A. (1993). Framing effects and the distributive aspects of integrative bargaining. 
56 Organizational Behavior and Human Process, 459-474; Neale, M. A. and Bazerman, 
M. H. (1985). ‘The effects of framing and negotiation overconfidence on bargaining 
behaviors and outcomes’. 28 Academy of Management Journal, 34-49. 
 
26 See Colett, P. (1977), The Rules of Conduct, in P. Colett (ed.), Social Rules and 
Social Behavior, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Individuals often seek fast and satisfactory 
solutions rather than rational consideration of all choices). 
- 24 - 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art11
individuals, these co-owner may withhold these right from other users to an 
inefficient level. 
 
Four main results can be drawn from the experiment: 
 
1. Our results confirm the theoretical proposition that anticommons deadweight 
losses increase with the degree of complementarity between individual parts, 
and with the degree of fragmentation. This paper illustrates the pricing effect of 
the anticommons. The results in experiment A and B show a clear positive 
correlation between the percentage of the surplus holders demanded by the 
individual property right holders and (i) the degree of complementarity of 
individual parts into the buyer’s project (A); and (ii) the number of individual 
right holders (B). 
 
2. Individual right holders base their reservation price on a proportion of the 
expected surplus of the bundler-purchaser. They disregard the objective value of 
the good altogether. In one instance (experiment C) the purchaser faces five 
subjects that each demanded 25% of the expected value of his project.  
 
3. In cases of uncertainty the anticommons pricing effect is amplified. The 
results in experiments D and E suggest that the subjects ignore the expected 
value of the purchaser’s project, and instead focus on the upper range of 
profitability of surplus. Willingness to accept seems to be anchored onto a 
proportion of the maximum profitability, rather than a proportion of the 
expected benefits of the project. In Experiment D this focal point led to a total 
reservation price that was 7 times above the expected value of the project. This 
created a serious gap between what individual right holder were asking, on the 
one hand, and what a third party entrepreneur could reasonable offer.  
 
Another more subtle response to risk emerges from the comparison of 
experiments D and E. Reservation prices seem to be consistently lower in cases 
where there is large uncertainty but a possible positive outcome, relative to 
scenarios where there is relative certainty but with a chance of negative 
outcome (see figure 6). Subjects seem to emphasize the relative low probability 
of success in D over the possibility of a negative outcome in the E.  
 
4. When stakes are minor the individual right holders state disproportionately 
high reservation prices – 35% in the case of a project with expected value of 100 
euros. Where stakes are higher, the average reservation price remains relatively 
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stable at 14-19% of the expected surplus.  This all-or-nothing strategy surfaces 
throughout the various experiments.  
 
 
* * * 
 
To summarize, our experiment provides clear indications of the pricing effect in 
settings where complementary units are fragmented over individual right 
holders. Absent price coordination among these right holders, the independent 
pricing decisions place a high burden on a third party interested purchaser.  
 
Our experiment leaves the dynamics of negotiations among fragmented owners 
to further research.27 Instead, the results provide a proxy of the burden of 
negotiation that rest with a buyer who seeks to rebundle independently-owned 
property fragments. The results provide an indication of the extend of the price 
concessions that a prospective seller will need to obtain to bring the price of 
bundling within the limits of the net expected value of bundling. If we assume 
that initial selling prices are sticky,28 the prospective costs of negotiations might 
lead to abandonment of value maximizing projects, leading to the tragic 
outcome of under use or idleness.  
 
                                                 
27 On the impact of discusion and interaction in enhancing cooperation in social 
dilemmas, see e.g., Dawes, et al., ‘ Cooperation for the Benefit of us – Not me, or my 
conscience’, in Mansbridge, Jane J. (ed.) (1990), Beyond Self-Interest, Univ. of Chicago 
Press. 
 
28 When the height of reservation prices is due to the attribution effect it is likely that 
price concessions will be hard to obtain. Cognitive psychology documents people's 
inclination to discount new evidence that conflict with their prior beliefs (belief 
perseverance).  According to confirmatory bias, people tend to misconstrue or 
misinterpret information so that it becomes additional information that supports the 
initial hypothesis. The initial experiments include Darley, John M. & Gross, Paget H. 
(1983), ‘A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects’, 44 (1) J. Personality & 
Social Psychology 20 (identical additional information is interpreted differently because 
of prior beliefs of backgrounds); Schrag, Joel (1999), ‘First Impressions Matter: A 
Model of Confirmatory Bias’, 114 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 37 (a formal 
model demonstrating how confirmatory bias may induce overconfidence).  
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In this regard, our results reinforce the normative hypothesis of the 
anticommons: property right systems should be careful in allowing the liberal 
creation and fragmentation of property rights.29 Strong property rights in 
complementary resources can be too much of a good thing. 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 See Parisi, Francesco (2002), ‘Entropy in Property’, 50 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 701-738. 
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